The downgrading of the tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) products backed by real estate related assets has caused severe disruptions in the housing and financial markets. The rating agencies have been criticized for the opacity in the rating process of the CDO products and also for giving the CDO tranches higher ratings than they deserved. However, not enough attention has been paid to the decision making process of the agencies to downgrade the CDO tranches. We use data from Moody's CDO database to reconstruct the process through which Moody's eventually downgraded the tranches. We use a discrete hazard rate model to study the variables that were relevant in the downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs. The empirical results show that out of the many CDO specific variables relevant to their ratings made available by Moody's few have any explanatory power beyond the Moody's Deal Scores (MDS). We show that the MDS could be explained by the changes in the Case-Shiller Composite-20 Index and Markit ABX.HE indices. Further analysis shows that Moody's mostly relied on the changes in the Case-Shiller indexes in revising the MDS.
Introduction
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) pool economic assets (e.g. loans, bonds, mortgage account receivables, etc.) and issue multiple classes of financial claims with different levels of seniority (or tranches) against the collateral pool. Individual asset risk should be diversified so long as the pooled assets are not perfectly correlated. CDOs bundle the cash flows from the underlying assets, which are often illiquid receivables, into tradable tranches. This theoretically facilitates the redistribution of risks within the financial sector, which could have a positive impact on financial stability. More importantly, the structured nature of the claims with different levels of seniority makes it possible for investors with different risk profiles to participate in this market. The increase in the packaging of mortgage loan related assets into The collapse in the CDO market was triggered by the wholesale downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs by the rating agencies. After the downgrades, financial institutions that have invested 3 in the CDO products incurred significant losses on their CDO holdings; which have led to big write-downs. The downgrades also forced some institutional investors (who were also major investors in the CDOs) to hold fire sales of their CDO holdings, thereby pushing the values of the CDO products even further down. The big three rating agencies (Moody's, S&P and Fitch) have been under criticism for their role in the collapse of the CDO market. They have been faulted for the opacity in the rating process of the CDOs, for using incorrect rating methodologies and assumptions, and also for not demanding more information from mortgage borrowers initially. There have also been conflict of interest questions raised about the relationship between CDO issuers and the rating agencies: in some cases the agencies helped the CDO issuers package the underlying assets to garner a specific rating by setting up ancillary consulting services. As a result of the large fees 4 the rating agencies were making from rating these CDOs and also from helping to package them, they may not have been as alert as they should have been. The CDO issuers could also shop 5 for better ratings, which put a lot of pressure on the rating agencies to give favorable ratings to the CDOs. Given the size and complexity of the collaterals (in some cases these assets are themselves tranches of other CDOs)
in the CDO deals, it was costly for investors to independently price and evaluate all the assets in the collateral pool. As such, investors relied on the ratings giving by the rating agencies to assess their credit risks and also make their investment decisions. The agencies created a perception 6 that the rated CDOs had the same risk as similarly rated corporate bonds. This attracted a lot of investors to these highly rated CDOs, fuelling the growth of the CDO market during the 2003 to 2007 years.
There have been different theories as to why the CDOs backed by real estate assets were downgraded massively during the recent financial crisis: (1) the underlying assets were of low quality to begin with and they deteriorated in value during the financial crisis causing the CDOs to fail the quality tests required to support their initial ratings. (2) The variables, default correlation 7 in particular, pertinent for the ratings of the CDOs were underestimated (the socalled "underestimation theory") leading the agencies to give generous ratings to the CDOs. As these variables were revised during the crisis the tranches of the CDOs were downgraded accordingly. (3) The ratings methodology employed by the agencies to rate the CDOs was faulty.
Obtaining reliable data on CDOs is difficult, since CDOs are not actively traded on exchanges. I have been fortunate to be given access to one of the most extensive data on CDOs 4 This represented a significant portion of their revenues. 5 Becker and Milbourn (2011), Faltin-Traeger and Bolton et al. (2012) , Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) 6 Given their role as the assessors of credit risk (Nationally Recognized Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation) their ratings of the CDO were taken at face value. The ratings were relied on for investment and capital requirements decisions. 7 This measures the default correlation of the underlying assets. A low default correlation value assigned to a CDO implies most of its tranches would be highly rated.
The total percentage of subprime, alternative and prime mortgage loan related assets which made up only about 15% of the total assets in CDO products in 2000 increased to over 80% by 2006.
Real estate related assets became the main collateral in the CDO deals during the securitization boom.
For the CDO deals backed by real estate related assets included in the study, about 70% of the tranches were rated A or better. At the end of the sample period (May 2009), only 52% of the tranches rated AAA were still rated AAA, only 58% of the AA tranches were still rated AA and only 14% of A tranches were still rated A.
We use a discrete hazard rate model to study the variables that were relevant in the downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs backed by real estate related assets. The paper does not find empirical support for the default correlation "underestimation theory". The overwhelming factor in the wholesale downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs backed by real estate related assets during the crisis was the collapse in the housing market.
The paper contributes to the growing empirical literature that has been examining CDO deals at the micro level. Coval et al (2009) documented some of the challenges faced by the rating agencies, in particular, the parameter and modeling assumptions that are required to arrive at accurate ratings of structured finance products. Coval et al concluded that, unlike traditional corporate bonds, whose fortunes are primarily driven by firm-specific considerations, the performance of securities created by tranching large asset pools is strongly affected by the performance of the economy as a whole. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) presented evidence on the relation between CDO credit ratings and the quality of the underlying collateral backing these securities. A large fraction of the CDO tranches in their sample had AAA 9 ratings (70%). They provided evidence which showed a mismatch between the rating of CDO tranches and the credit quality of the underlying assets supporting these tranches; while the credit rating of the majority of the tranches is AAA, the average credit rating of the collateral is B+ 10 . Mason and Rosner (2007) showed that many of the difficulties in the CDO market backed by real estate related assets could be attributed to the incorrect ratings given to them. The incorrect ratings were a result of rating agencies rating CDO products by misapplying the methodologies used for rating corporate bonds. This methodological issue was further compounded by the inaccurate estimates of the underlying variables (e.g. default correlation of the underlying assets, etc.).
Our conclusion is similar to the conclusions reached by these papers: (1) we also observed in our analyses, limited to CDO ratings of mortgaged related assets, that CDO ratings are more affected by the performance of the economy as whole rather than CDO-specific variables. (2) The diversification benefit which was expected from pooling all the different assets, thereby influencing the ratings of CDOs backed by mortgage related assets, was not as potent as initially thought.
9 Griffin and Tang (2012) The CDO structure consists of an asset manager in charge of managing the portfolio. The funds needed to purchase the underlying assets are obtained from the issuance of debt obligations.
The debt obligations are also referred to as tranches, and they are:
 Senior tranches
 Mezzanine tranches

 Equity tranche
A rating is sought for all but the equity tranche. The tranches are prioritized depending on how they absorb losses from the underlying assets in case of default. Senior tranches only absorb losses after the mezzanine and equity tranches have been exhausted. This allows the senior tranche to get a credit rating higher than the average rating of the underlying assets as a whole.
The senior tranche usually attracts at least an A rating. Since the equity tranche receives the residual cash flow, no rating is sought for the tranche. Figure 1 shows the basic CDO structure:
11 According to Moody's , the percentage of CDOs that had other structured assets as their collateral increased from 2.6% in 1998 to 55% in 2006 as a fraction of the total notional of all securitization. In 2006 alone, issuance of structured CDO reached $350B in notional value (Hu, 2007) . Table 1 is an example that shows the percentage of losses that has to be absorbed by the lower tranches before the senior tranche is affected: 5% of the notional value of the underlying assets has to default before the coupon and principal payments to the mezzanine tranches get affected. For all defaults below 5%, the only investor who gets affected is the equity tranche investor. The senior tranche does not get affected until 15% of the underlying asset defaults. 
Coverage tests
13 are run to make sure that the CDO is performing within prespecified guidelines before any payments are made to the mezzanine and equity tranches. The prespecified guidelines are included in the prospectus given to investors before the tranches of the CDOs are sold. If the CDO faults the coverage tests, then excess interest on the portfolio are diverted to pay the interest and principal on the senior tranche from the mezzanine and equity tranches. Quality
Tests that deal with maturity restrictions, the degree of diversification, and credit ratings of assets in the collateral portfolio must also be satisfied for the tranches of the CDO to maintain the credit rating assigned at the time of issuance. Figure 2 shows the distribution of CDO underlying asset types over the years. Since 2001, the share of the Subprime, Alt and Prime RMBS has increased over time. 13 The information about the tests is provided in the prospectus before the sale. Coverage tests are designed to protect note holders against deterioration of the existing portfolio. There are two categories of testsovercollateralization tests (OC) and interest coverage (IC) tests. The OC for a tranche is found by computing the ratio of the principal balance of the collateral portfolio over the principal balance of the tranche and all tranches senior to it. The higher the ratio, the greater protection for the note holders; the value is usually compared to the required minimum ratio specified in the guidelines. The IC test is the ratio of scheduled interest due on the underlying collateral portfolio to scheduled interest to be paid to that tranche and all the tranches senior to it. Again the higher the IC ratio, the greater the protection; the value is usually compared to the required minimum ratio specified in the guidelines. 
Data
The data was obtained from Moody's and it contains information (collateral, deal and tranche levels) on Moody's rated CDO deals. The data on the underlying assets of the CDO deals are: the type of the assets (loans, equity, or bond), the price that was paid for the underlying assets, who rated the included assets (Moody's, Fitch or S&P), the recovery rate of the underlying assets, industry classification of the assets, the expected average life of the assets, yield to maturity of the assets, seasoning (how long the assets have been in existence) etc. The deal level data include: the notional values of the CDOs, the par value of the defaulted securities, the par value of the defaulted securities loss, principal and interest cash collected from the underlying assets, The tranche level data include the initial and current ratings of the tranches, the amount of each tranches issued in relation to the total value of the CDO deal, coupon rate of the tranches, the estimated net asset value of the tranches, and the attachment and detachment points of the tranches.
Deals Included
The sample is divided into three categories: (a) All CDOs backed by collateral consisting of only real estate related assets 14 (Real Estate), (b) All CDOs backed by collateral consisting of only non-real estate related assets (Non Real Estate), and (c) All CDO backed by both real estate related assets and non-real estate related assets (Mixed).
There are 1936 Moody's rated CDOs included in this study 15 ; of which 1119 are only Real Estate Deals, 121 are Non Real Estate Deals, and 696 are Mixed Deals by my classification. Table 3 reports the average par value of the collateral of the deals included in the study.
Total Tranche Amount of the Deals
The Real Estate only deals have an average of $902M, the Non Real Estate deals have an average of $243M and the Mixed deals have an average of $550M. 
Types of Tranches
About 85% of the tranches of the Real Estate deals were either senior or mezzanine (both these tranches are rated). Since losses are allocated from the bottom up, it takes significant losses from the underlying assets for the senior tranches to be affected when there are large numbers of mezzanine tranches. The Real Estate CDO deals have more mezzanine tranches, making the senior tranches more attractive to investors since they are better "protected" from losses. 
Tranche Ratings
Due to the costs involved for investors to independently monitor all the assets in a CDO portfolio, investors rely on the credit ratings of the CDOs to judge how risky they are and also to make investment decisions. In the absence of hard data on some of the assets underlying the CDO products, the rating agencies make assumptions about the values of these variables and rely mainly on simulations to determine the ratings they give to the CDOs. For example, until 2007, Moody's did not require issuers seeking ratings on products backed by mortgages to provide information on borrowers' debt-to-income ratio, appraisal type and which lender originated the loan. 16 There is also very limited empirical work on CDO tranche losses in the event of defaults due to their very short history.
How CDOs are Rated
According to Moody's Approach to Rating Multisector CDOs (2000), Moody's consider these variables in determining CDO Ratings:
 Likelihood of default of underlying assets
 Recovery rates
Collateral Diversification: a diversity score is calculated by dividing the assets in the CDO portfolio into different classifications. This also measures the default correlation of the underlying assets. A higher diversity score implies that it is less likely that all the assets would default at the same time. It plays a very important role in the ratings of the tranches; depending on how high the diversity score is, a large fraction of the issued tranches can end up with a higher rating than the average rating of the underlying pool of assets. This means that there will be a bigger percentage of higher-rated tranches (senior and mezzanine) in the CDO. To get a high diversification score, a CDO will normally include a lot of different securities.
Likelihood of Default is provided by the weighted average rating factor (WARF). The
WARF is a guide to asset quality of the portfolio and is meant to incorporate the probability of default for each of the bonds in the CDO. For example, a WARF score of 610 means that there is a 6.1% probability of default for each independent and uncorrelated asset in 10 year period.
Recovery Rates are dependent on the desired rating of the CDO tranche. Ratings agencies have data on the historical recovery rate 17 of bonds they have rated, and based on this data they calculate a weighted recovery rate for the portfolio.
The agencies have an expected loss permissible for each CDO tranche to garner a specific rating. For each tranche of the deals, a simulated expected loss is compared to the maximum permitted for any given rating. 
Comparisons
This section reports some of the characteristics of the underlying assets for the three categories of the CDO deals: Real Estate, Non Real Estate and Mixed.
Average Weighted Seasoning of Collateral
On average the securities in the Non Real Estate deals are more seasoned than the Real Estate Deals. 
Types of Assets in Collateral of the Deals
Weighted Average Maturity
On average, the securities in the collateral of the Real Estate deals have more years left for them to mature. As a result, the Real Estate deals might be subject to more market risk. 
How the Downgrades Occurred
This section provides more information about the tranche downgrade process. There are Only 52% of the tranches rated AAA were still rated AAA on May, 13 2009; 37% were downgraded to CCC or lower. Also, only 58% of the AA tranches were still rated AA, most were downgraded to CCC or lower. There seem to be shorter jumps in the downgrading of the lower tranches compared to the AAA and AA tranches of the CDOs.
23 WR indicates the rating was withdrawn by Moody's but no new ratings were given.
Explaining Downgrades
The AAA tranche is downgraded. In addition to the default correlation and a measure of the quality of the underlying asset, the paper also considers some CDO specific characteristics that might contribute to their downgrading. In addition, we also make use of Moody's Deal Scores (MDS).
Estimation Procedure-Discrete Hazard Rate Model
The framework chosen for the analysis is a discrete time proportional hazard rate model.
Let be a discrete duration random variable for a CDO , where
The conditional hazard rate,
, is the probability of a downgrade of CDO in any Quarter given covariates :
The survival probability at Quarter is defined as the probability of a CDO not experiencing a downgrade, which is defined as:
Suppose the duration of the study is made up of Quarters periods. A CDO could be downgraded in any Quarter , which implies that or the study concludes without being downgraded, i.e.
, in other words, the CDO is censored.
For the uncensored CDOs with , the likelihood may be expressed in terms of the hazard as:
For the censored CDO, (which implies ) the likelihood can be expressed as:
The likelihood for the full sample is:
Where if the CDO is uncensored and zero otherwise. The log likelihood function can then be expressed as:
In this study, there are five quarters: 26 The differences are calculated as follows: in Quarter (2, 3, 4, and 5), the difference of the MDS, , are calculated for both the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals. The variables of the downgraded CDOs are not collected anymore after the Quarter in which it was downgraded; each Quarter presents new deals that were downgraded in that Quarter.
6.2.A-Summary Statistic of the CDOs with any of their Tranches Downgraded
Table 12
This table reports the summary statistics of the averages of the differences of the Moody's Deal Scores for the downgraded (D) and the non-downgraded (ND) deals. The differences are calculated as follows: in Quarter (2, 3, 4, and 5), the difference of the MDS, , are calculated for both the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals. Table 13 reports the dynamics of the downgraded deals and the non-downgraded deals over the five Quarters. The percentage of the assets in the CDO portfolio that are rated at CCC or below (PR) is higher for the downgraded CDOs than the non-downgraded CDOs in all the quarters. The CDOs with higher weighted average maturity (WAM) were downgraded earlier than the other CDOs. The weighted average coupons (WAC) of the bond securities in the CDO portfolios are higher for the non-downgraded CDOS in all the Quarters. Likelihood of Defaults (represented by the WARF factor of the CDOs), did not exhibit the trend which was expected except for the second and third quarters. Equation (7) has the same form as the standard likelihood function for regression analysis of a binary variable with as the dependent variable. This allows the discrete time hazard models to be estimated by binary dependent variable methods.
Quarter ∆MDS
The hazard function is assumed to take the form:
Where is the baseline hazard function and is modeled by using dummy variables indexing time periods. In the Full Model the Moody's Deal Score (MDS) still has a positive impact on the probability of downgrading, but the effect is lower (0.803 vs. 0.403).
Estimation Results of the Baseline Model for the CDOs with any of its Tranches
Downgraded
Estimation Results of the Full Model for the CDOs with any of its Tranches Downgraded
The Collateral Diversification (CD) measures how correlated the assets in the CDO portfolio is. It is an important variable in the rating methodology of the CDOs; a higher CD score plays an important role in determining how many of the CDO tranches will be given higher ratings. From the estimation, CD scores have a positive impact on a probability of a deal being downgraded, i.e. deals with higher CD scores have a higher hazard rate, and hence shorter survival time. As Moody's revise the initial CD scores downwards, it downgraded the tranches.
Portfolios with a higher percentage of CCC or lower rated underlying assets are likely to be downgraded during the crises because the underlying assets are most likely to default. These CCC and below assets also have lower recovery rates after default. As the results show, the percentage of CCC rated securities or below (PR) has a positive impact on the probability of downgrading, i.e. deals that have a higher percentage of their assets downgraded to CC or worse have higher hazard and hence shorter survival rate. Table 18 reports the average defaulted amount of the underlying assets of the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals, and the average loss of the defaulted assets, i.e. the amount that could not be recovered after the default. The par value of the deals is the average total par value of the underlying assets of the CDOs. On average about 7% of the underlying asset of the downgraded deals and about 6.4% of the Non-downgraded deals defaulted, but only 41% of the defaulted assets were recovered while 66% of the defaulted securities of the non-downgraded deals were recovered. Since the downgraded deals had a higher percentage of their underlying assets rated CCC or below, the table shows that the CDO managers were not able to recover as much compared to nondowngraded deals which had a lower percentage of CCC assets when the assets defaulted.
Although bonds with high coupon rates usually have high default rates, a high coupon rate bond with a short maturity usually has shorter duration as it receives more cash flows upfront. As Table 17 shows, Weighted Average Coupon Rate (WAC) has a negative impact on the probability of downgrading, i.e. deals with higher assets coupon rates have lower hazard and hence longer survival rate. In economic crises, CDO portfolios with more cash flows (or deals that have built up a sizable cash reserve from their earlier cash flows) are more likely to pass their overcollateralization and the interest coverage tests; as such they might be less likely to be downgraded.
I find no effect of the Likelihood of Default (WARF), Weighted Average Maturity (WAM) and the Weighted Average Spread (WAS) on the survival of the CDOs. Theoretically an increase in the WARF (which should occur during financial crises as more of the underlying assets get downgraded) should increase the probability of the downgrade of the tranches. For any given CDO deal rated by Moody's, hundreds of the underlying assets are rated by Moody's and other rating agencies. The lack of clear upward trend of the WARF scores in Tables 13 and 15 might indicate a delayed effect of Moody's correctly updating the new ratings of the underlying assets as they are changed. This would imply that the reported WARF scores do not correctly reflect the riskiness of the underlying assets leading to an absence of any effect on the downgrading probability. From Table 13 the downgraded deals had a higher WAM than the nondowngraded deals for all the Quarters. The absence of any effect of the WAM on the probability of the downgrade suggests that the average time left for the underlying assets to mature in the CDO portfolios was not as important as the quality of the assets. The market risk exposure for these long term maturity assets was not significant. 
Comparison of Baseline Model and Full Model
Non-Proportional Hazard
The hazard model postulated implicitly assumes that a predictor has an identical effect every time period. By interacting the time dummies with the covariates in the hazard model we can show whether the effect of the covariates differs from time period to time period. A second regression involving CD, MDS, WAC and PR and the interaction terms between the time dummies was run. The results of the regression from the interaction term produced very few significant terms; only and were significant at 5% and we could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the interaction terms were jointly zero. This suggests that the effects of the covariates are probably identical in every time period.
Estimation Results for the Full Model for the CDOs with Downgraded AAA Tranches
In both categories of downgrading the Moody's Deal Scores plays a significant role in whether the tranches of the CDO deals would be downgraded or not. 
Causality
In Section 6 we showed that the Moody's Deal Score ( The ABX.HE indices trade on price rather than spread terms with a predetermined fixed coupon 30 which is determined prior to the launch of a new series. The protection buyer pays (usually monthly) the fixed rate amount over the life of the contract based on the current notional amount of the index. The index contract is not terminated when a credit event occurs (short fall of interest rate or principal), rather it continues with a reduced notional amount until maturity.
B Case-Shiller Home Price Index
The Case-Shiller Home Price Index indices are designed to measure the changes in the total value of all existing single-family housing stock. The index also tracks the overall direction of the housing market. Rating agencies might take the fluctuations of this index into an account when they are revising the ratings they have already given to the tranches of the CDOs backed by real estate related assets. methodology. The method produces a cap-weighted index for residential real estate in nine US census regions. The national composite is then produced from the regional indices using census weight. Table 23  This table reports 33 This is the period during which almost all the downgrading took place in the sample. 
Data
Empirical Results
We follow Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation procedure which differences the model to get rid of the individual specific effects. This also gets rid of any endogeneity that may be due to the correlation of the individual effects and the right hand side regressors. The moment conditions utilize the orthogonality conditions between the differenced errors and lagged values of the dependent variable. This assumes that the original disturbances are serially uncorrelated.
Based on the estimation results, a conclusion on causality will be reached by running Wald tests on the coefficients of the lagged to check whether they are statistically different from zero. Table 24 reports the results for estimating equation (9) (11) 
Conclusion
The collapse of the market for CDOs backed by real estate related assets has caused severe disruptions in the housing and financial markets. It is now much more difficult to package newly originated mortgage loans to be sold to CDO managers. The mortgage packaging frenzy of the 2002 to 2006 years left little time for thorough examination of the quality of these loans which were being packaged into CDOs. The waves of CDO tranche downgrades have prompted a review of the underlying assets of the CDO portfolios. This paper documents some of the characteristic of the underlying assets of the CDOs which might have contributed to the downgrades of the CDO tranches. The underlying assets (which were mostly mortgage loans related assets) of the CDO portfolios were not seasoned. These unseasoned loans defaulted in significant numbers during the economic recession. Also, a sizable percentage of the underlying assets were of low quality assets which defaulted in bigger numbers during the economic crises.
The paper uses a discrete hazard rate model to study the variables that contributed the most to the downgrading of the tranches of the CDO deals. The empirical results showed that the Moody's Deal Score, the default correlation of the underlying assets, the percentage of the underlying assets of the CDO portfolios rated at CCC or below and the Weighted Average 
